INDIA CLIMATE WATCH – DECEMBER 2009 (Issue 9)

INSIDE THIS ISSUE

From the Editor’s Desk
India announces energy intensity target
Minister Ramesh defends Indian red lines in Parliament
Copenhagen COP15 – A Day-by-Day Summary
Post-Copenhagen – Parliament debates the Accord
Minister clarifies Accord to Rajya Sabha

Editor:
Malini Mehra

Research & Reporting:
Kaavya Nag, Pranav Sinha, Somya Bhatt

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From the Editor’s Desk

People will be discussing the Copenhagen climate conference for years to come. Opinions will be mixed as to whether it was a step forward or a failure. Only history will tell whether it was a turning point or a tipping point.
The Copenhagen Accord – the 3-page document to emerge from the UN Climate conference – has dubious legal status and was not adopted, simply ‘noted’, by the  Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on 19 December 2009. Its very existence, however, could now risk the architecture established by the UNFCCC to combat global climate change.
There is much that is wrong with the agreement. It is not legally-binding, contains no mid-term or long-term targets for emissions reductions and critically does not refer to a ‘peaking’ year for global emissions in order to keep within the ‘safe’ limit of 2 degrees C of warming (since pre-industrial times).
 
Neither has it followed the guidance of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that indicates three benchmarks for avoiding dangerous climate change: (1) developed countries must reduce emissions by 25- 40 percent by 2020 from 1990 levels, (2) global emissions must peak and then begin to decline by 2020, and (3) global emissions must decline by 50% by 2050.
 
The Copenhagen Accord contains a reference to 2 degrees C but does not endorse it. Given that there are no targets, no peaking years, no trajectories for emissions reductions, only vague rhetoric, this is effectively an agreement for business-as-usual.
According to the Accord, countries that sign-on will not be required to adopt nationally-binding targets but invited to submit voluntary numbers. This will effectively convert what was hoped to be a high-ambition, globally-binding international regime into a more laissez-faire, self-determined ‘Pledge and Review’ system for each country with no international compliance mechanism.

Granted there are some ‘wins’ in the agreement, in four main areas: short and long-term finance; a review in 2015;  transparency in monitoring, reporting and verifying (MRV) actions; and mechanisms on forests (REDD+) and technology. There is some cold comfort here. If the fast-track financing of $10 billion per year till 2012, and longer term financing of $100 billion per year by 2020, does materialize, it will come as much-needed adaptation assistance for the poorest, most vulnerable countries.

But the price paid for the Copenhagen Accord is a heavy one. The lure was the prospect of securing an Energy bill in the US Senate and finally getting US engagement in an international regime. Countries with the most to lose such as small island states, and even the European Union – which now remains the only region locked into legally-binding emissions controls – have given their acquiesance grudgingly for a deal seen as the least worst option on the table.

As a result of the low-ambition nature of the Accord, however, the EU now says that it will not raise its emissions cuts – long held as a bargaining chip – from 20 percent to 30 percent by 2020. An almost immediate chilling effect of the Accord.

Far worse, however, is the fear that if implemented according to the business-as-usual emissions targets announced so far by countries, the Accord will actually set the world on course for a 3 to 4 degree C world.

The ‘Copenhagen Accord’ is a cruel blow, a setback for millions around the world who had put their hope in their leaders to deliver on climate protection. Never before had such a constellation of groups and institutions calling for urgent and decisive action on climate change been assembled – from civil society, faith groups, business, investors, scientists, engineers and professional organizations, to the UN itself which ran an unprecedented ‘Seal the Deal’ campaign.
Leaders responded to the call and came – but they did not deliver. This is a failure of historic proportions because an ‘encore’ will be very difficult.

What Copenhagen made blindingly clear is how the world has changed. We are in a new geo-political era. Gone are the days of lazy definitions of the world as ‘developed’ and ‘developing’. The Copenhagen Accord was hammered through not by the US, EU and Japan as yesterday’s politics would have suggested. No, the Copenhagen Accord was negotiated by the US and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). These are the new power brokers in the climate arena – and when it comes to perceived national interest, each have shown that they will act as nakedly in their self-interest as western powers have.
It may well be that such an assessment is unfair and that the glass is half-full, instead of half-empty. At such a time in history, when the science is bleak and climate projections alarming, one has to take comfort wherever it can be found. The Copenhagen Accord might be a beginning – a first step towards a more collective approach to climate sanity by the major emitting countries, but it also marks the end of an age of illusion – and self-delusion.

India announces energy intensity target
 
All eyes were trained on the government this month as rumours spread of an imminent pre-Copenhagen announcement of Indian ‘numbers’ – a national target to follow on the heels of those already announced by other key developing countries such as China, Indonesia and Brazil. In a class act, Minister of State for Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, eventually unveiled the GoI’s plans to a rapt Parliament on 3rd December at a special session on climate change. Coming just days before the opening of the UN climate conference in Copenhagen there was strong interest – especially amongst younger parliamentarians – on the Government’s plans for Copenhagen. The target announced in Parliament was for India to reduce its carbon intensity by 20 to 25 % below 2005 levels by 2020. An unfamiliar term, carbon intensity refers to carbon equivalents emitted per unit of GDP, and implies more ‘lock-in’ in terms of carbon emissions reduction when compared to the other soft metric, energy intensity.

Ramesh explained that meeting this target would entail a number of very specific meansure. The GoI was planning on the following: introducing mandatory fuel-efficiency standards by 2011, deploying supercritical and cleaner technologies in coal-fired power plants, and enforcing green building codes. Whilst all of these actions have already been detailed under one of the missions of the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) – the mission on Enhanced Energy Efficiency – this has now been pledged as a voluntary cut in carbon intensity internationally.

Compared to China’s voluntary target of 40 to 45 percent carbon intensity reduction, India’s numbers are low and India was the last major emerging economy to announce its pledge. Admittedly, China’s global emissions are almost five times those of India and the government has been keen to differentiate itself from China. Showing a new degree of political coordination, however, India’s announcement came shortly after the meeting of the BASIC group – Brazil, South Africa, India and China- in Beijing in late November.    

Domestically, there is expected to be much debate on what carbon intensity cuts will imply, particularly for the manufacturing sector in India, and whether India should adopt a softer ‘energy intensity’ metric, rather than a ‘carbon intensity’ one. While India will not agree to any legally binding commitment that can be ‘wrapped up’ in a global agreement, this development is still within the boundaries of India’s ‘red lines’, and creates, according to Minister Jairam Ramesh, some flexibility in negotiating a climate deal.

India has agreed to have these domestic actions reported once every two years to the UN, as part of its National Communications to the UNFCCC. This is one of the major ‘gives’ India has acceded to.

For detailed commentary on the Indian target, see Malini Mehra’s piece ‘Hopenhagen – here comes India with a target and a plan’ in her Column on the Climate Challenge India Portal – www.climatechallengeindia.org

Minister Ramesh defends Indian red lines in Parliament

The 3rd December saw the Minister of State for Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh, lock horns with Parliamentarians in the Lok Sabha in a five-hour long session on climate that saw the Minister walk away having made his and the Government’s case with conviction and seeming to have won the house. There were eighteen interventions by MPs during the debate. Given the relevance of the responses, the Minister’s replies to key issues are provided in summary form below – largely in his own words:

India’s climate vulnerability

Forget Copenhagen, climate change is a very serious issue for India. The most vulnerable country in the world to climate change is India, not Maldives, not Bangladesh and not America because of our dependence on the monsoon, Himalayan glaciers and vast critical ecological areas which are threatened by climate change.

On per capita

The only position India had in International negotiations “Our per capita is very low; your per capita is very high; therefore we would not do anything.” Per capita is an accident of history because India could not control our population. India must negotiate from a position of strength; from a position of leadership. But, India need to offer something more to itself  and to its own people, to Sunderbans, to Western Ghats, to Uttarakhand, to Himalayas, to the North-East not to the world.

India’s approach to Copenhagen

India is going to Copenhagen with flexible and positive frame of mind. Flexibility means the ability to move to rapidly evolving international situations. Being a developing country and having global aspirations; India wants to be recognised as a world power. But having global aspirations and assuming global responsibilities are two sides of the same coin. Although India has not caused the problem of global warming, it will try and make sure that it is part of the solution being constructive and proactive.

India’s ‘red lines’ for Copenhagen

The two complete, dark, bright, red lines non-negotiables for India at Copenhagen
1.    Will not accept a legally-binding emissions reduction cut.
2.    Will not accept an agreement which stipulates a peaking year for India.

A third red line is:

3.    Subject all mitigation actions which are supported by international finance and technology to international review distinguishing between supported mitigation action and unsupported mitigation action.

But on this third non-negotiable, India could modulate its position in consultation with China, Brazil and South Africa.

On leadership

India needs to be aggressive on domestic obligation and pro-active on international obligation. India’s negotiating position is strengthened considerably if it goes to Copenhagen from a position of leadership, taking these pro-active measures and taking the responsibility as part of the 11th Five Year Plan, 12th Five Year Plan and thereafter between 2005 to 2020 our emission intensity would reduce by 20 per cent to 25 per cent on our own (Planning Commission Conclusion), in a legally non-binding agreement and to be reflected in any international agreement.

Copenhagen COP15 – A Day-by-Day Summary

7-19 December, 2009 marked the fifteenth meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP15) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Copenhagen. In what was one of the largest conferences on the environment, Copenhagen witnessed the culmination of a two-year process that began in Bali in 2007, with 115 world leaders, 40,000 members of civil society, and unprecedented public attention. While many Parties (countries that are a ‘party’ to the UNFCCC) and most civil society organisations were hopeful of a FAB deal – and agreement that was Fair, Ambitious and Binding – what they left with was something completely different – the Copenhagen Accord.

Day 1 at Copenhagen opened with hope and anticipation at the Bella Centre, the conference venue. Most knew that a legally binding deal at Copenhagen needed a miracle, but many hoped that the outcome would put in place the process to firm up an inked commitment in Mexico at COP16 next year. Negotiators were urged to be “constructive, flexible, courageous and ambitious”, and it was decided that all Long-term Cooperative Action (LCA) discussions would take place under a single contact group (as decided in Barcelona).

Key Indian negotiators, Chandrashekhar Dasgupta and Prodipto Ghosh were missing from the action, as they had still not arrived. Having challenged what they saw as the Minister’s ‘U-turns’ on India’s traditional climate negotiations, and seeking to play a hardline role, they were still in Delhi seeking ‘clarifications’ on the Environment Minister’s speech made in Parliament on 3rd December.
In the talks, the Indian delegation cautioned against mixing up the outcomes of the LCA and KP discussions with the high-level segment in week two.

Day 2 – LCA discussions broke into smaller working groups and negotiators were charged with filtering out core details of the LCA text. As the big numbers on targets, finance and commitments would be left to heads of state, negotiators were not entirely sure which non-paper to use as the basis for negotiations under each section of the LCA track. To make matters more complicated, a leaked Danish version of a proposed Copenhagen text created a buzz, with many Parties seeing it as a secretive and non-inclusive initiative that could potentially derail the focus of negotiations here.

Day 3 – President of the COP, Connie Hedegaard, chaired the Plenary sessions of the COP and COP/MOP on Wednesday. Proposals from new protocols under the Convention came from five countries at the COP. Tuvalu outlined its proposal for an amendment to the Kyoto and an additional legally binding protocol under the UNFCCC. Tuvalu’s request for a full contact group session to discuss all new proposals was backed by AOSIS, Latin America and Africa. But with India, China, Saudi Arabia and South Africa strongly opposing any such contact group, Connie Hedegaard’s proposal to establish one was shot down.

COP discussions were suspended as the intervention of the outspoken delegate, Ian Fry, from Tuvalu broken into the open the rifts within the 137-member grouping of G77 & China. Spontaneous civil society backing of the Tuvalu proposal broke out, and was marked by strong action even outside the Bella Centre.
Fry said: “Being one of the most vulnerable countries in world, our future rests on the outcome of this meeting … The time for procrastination is over. It is time to deliver.”

India rejected this and intervened four times – as did Saudi Arabia and China – to oppose formal discussions for a new protocol that would accompany the existing Kyoto Protocol, but include nations such as the USA which were not – and had clearly said that they would not be party to the Kyoto Protocol. The palpable nervousness in the room could well have been from major emerging economies wanting to maintain a Kyoto process out of the fear that a new treaty could ‘lock-in’ their own pledges and penalize them for defaulting on them.

In the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) discussions, India – supported by Saudi Arabia and China – asked for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) to be included into the CDM process, even as several others advised caution on the inclusion of methodologies still under scientific review.

Day 4 – Discussions on new proposals continued, and Japan outlined its new proposal for a protocol, arguing that the Kyoto Protocol only addressed 30% of global emissions and the remaining emissions – and emitters – needed to come under the purview of a new agreement. While Annex I countries tried to get as far away from the Kyoto Protocol as possible, non-Annex I countries stressed the fact that the Kyoto Protocol was still the only legally binding instrument under the UNFCCC. Once again, Tuvalu with African, AOSIS and Latin American Parties asked to suspend the COP.

Day 5 – A 10-page draft text (for the adoption of a political statement) was tabled by the LCA and KP Chairs. The EU Council, meeting in Brussels, announced that it would contribute 2.4 billion Euro in fast-track climate financing up to 2012, and that it was willing to contribute its share to a 100 billion Euro Adaptation and Mitigation finance plan.

Indian minister of Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh arrived in Copenhagen, and once again reiterated India’s red lines. Yet, he made it clear that India was not here ‘for confrontation or scoring debate points’.

Day 6 – This marked the start of week two and the Ministerial session of the talks. COP President, Connie Hedegaard, UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, convened informal discussions with ministers that continued until Sunday afternoon. At the reconvened COP, an emotional speech by Tuvalu asked for a serious consideration of its proposal, and asked Obama to honour his Nobel Peace Prize. The discussions of the LCA and KP texts showed that several Parties were dissatisfied with the text, with the EU saying the text did not give any assurance that the world could stay well below 2 degrees C. Officially, the UNFCCC secretariat said it would be difficult to expect a legally binding outcome, given the constraints of time.

India agreed with the G77 and China that the sanctity of a two-track process must be maintained, and again strongly resisted the Tuvalu proposal for discussions on a new protocol.

Marking the Global Day of Action in Copenhagen on 12th December, an estimated 30,000 people marched from the city centre towards the Bella Centre in a show of public force and demanding action for a FAB deal. However, with little progress on any discussions by end of week one, it was clear that without the major decisions in place, negotiations were unlikely to prove fruitful.

Day 7 – Any progress on LCA discussions were suspended as developing country Parties led by the Africa group asked for KP discussions to conclude first. The fear was that KP discussions would be kept for ‘later’ and that by the 18th it would be too late to decide on any issues under it. As far as the LCA Chair’s text was concerned, India had issues with six paragraphs of the text, which Jairam Ramesh said crossed the red lines.

Day 8 – Wednesday December 16th marked the start of the High-level segment with heads of state arriving and security went through the roof. As UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said “We are here today to write a different future”. With bi- and plurilateral discussions in full swing, and NGO access severely restricted to the Bella Centre, LCA discussions began only at 4:45 am on Wednesday morning. The Chair of the LCA said there was not sufficient consensus on areas of disagreement, and pleaded to Parties to move forward on the text. While delegates were kept awake throughout the night, the closing plenary was shifted to late morning on Thursday 17th owing to some ‘major problems’ that some Parties had with the texts.

India’s Jairam Ramesh was seen to keep a low profile during this time, only to be caught on camera while coming out of a conference to say that the Kyoto Protocol is in ‘intensive care if not dead’.

Day 9 – Discord and a fair amount of chaos marked the three days of the High-level Segment, with the Danish Prime Minister – who took over from Connie Hedegaard as President of the COP when the heads of state began to arrive – tabling the Danish text which was “put forward from the sky” in the words of a disgruntled Brazilian delegate. Supported by China, Brazil indicated that the procedure had been far from transparent, and that the AWGs were the only legitimate basis for negotiations.

France and the chair of the Africa Group, Ethiopia issued a joint call to limit warming below 2 degrees.

India asked for a preservation of the two track process, and Jairam Ramesh called Australia the ‘Ayatollah of the one-track process’ for its insistence on a single comprehensive outcome.

Day 10 – The resumed meeting of the COP saw little progress, even as heads of state began to arrive, owing to significant procedural wrangling. The High-level Segment continued throughout the day, even as the halls of the Bella Centre remained empty without civil society presence. The one good news for the day came with the arrival of US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, who announced that the US would contribute to mobilizing a global fund of USD 100 billion a year by 2020 for poor and vulnerable countries on condition that major economies take meaningful mitigation actions and agree to full transparency. Japan re-announced its Hatoyama initiative, and pledged USD 11 billion in public finance towards developing country mitigation and adaptation actions.

Jairam Ramesh said his talks with Hillary Clinton were constructive, saying they had agreed 75% on a 4-point agenda for transparency on MRV. He also said the conditions for a political deal were present.

Separately, Jairam Ramesh and US Energy Secretary, Steven Chu, released Technology Action Plans to advance bilateral and multilateral cooperation on clean technology development.  

Another faint ray of the day was the announcement that the two-track process would continue.

Day 11 – At the closing COP Plenary in the early hours of 18th December, Parties adopted the decision to extend the AWG-LCA’s mandate, since no decision had been reached at Copenhagen.

Following a lack-lustre and US-focused speech at the informal heads of state session, President Obama cancelled a one-on one meeting with Danish Prime Minister, to go into a multilateral meeting with several heads of state.

High drama and a turning point took place in an action-packed day (and night), when President Obama strode into a meeting of the Heads of State of the BASIC country group – Brazil, South Africa, India and China, saying “we really need a deal”. In an open attempt to persuade the BASIC countries agree to a consensus draft, he reportedly said “it is better to take one step forward than two steps back. I’m willing to be flexible”.

The essentials of a Copenhagen Accord were drafted by Heads of State themselves, with details left to negotiators. 28 nations, representative of all regional groupings, discussed the US/BASIC draft and rubber stamped the political agreement. As President Nasheed of the Maldives said, “The Copenhagen Accord is amicable – not the best, but a beginning that can migrate to bigger ambitions”.

Day 12 – Now well into overtime, the COP moved into Saturday 19th December for a plenary discussion on the BASIC-US deal that had been hammered out in the closed group of 28 countries the night before. Brought into the larger plenary of 193 nations, the Copenhagen Accord was not adopted – despite efforts by the UK, Maldives and others – due to vocal objections by a small number of Parties – Sudan, Venezuela, Bolivia, Tuvalu and a handful of others – who objected to the process by which this political agreement had been reached. Overtired delegations, struggled to stay awake through the marathon morning session.

The Danish prime minister – a novice at the diplomacy and technical skill required to run such an intergovernmental process had been persuaded to leave as Chair and in his place, seasoned officials took over and gaveled a swifter way to the end. Parties maintained their positions on fundamental issues to the bitter end, and a lack of consensus meant that ‘consultations’ would have to be undertaken in the following year. The Copenhagen Accord was merely ‘taken note of’ but COP decisions to extend the mandate of the LCA and KP working groups extended.

The “most important meeting in the history of the world” had come to an end.  

For more detailed daily reporting from Copenhagen by CSM, see the Daily ICWs (India Climate Watch reports) from Copenhagen on the CCI Portal: www.climatechallengeindia.org

Post-Copenhagen – Parliament debates the Accord

Soon after Jairam Ramesh returned from Copenhagen, he presented India’s actions there, and defended the Copenhagen Accord to members of India’s upper house of Parliament, the Rajya Sabha. Highlighting India’s role in the drafting of the negotiations and defending India’s ‘red lines’, he detailed aspects of the Copenhagen Accord and emphasized that India’s red lines had been defended.  

While admitting that India had deviated from its original stand on certain issues such as monitoring and verification (MRV) and agreed to a qualitative peaking – measured in terms of maximum global temperature rise of 2 degree Celsius – he assured MPs that this was not a breach of sovereignty, nor undermining India’s development interests. Rather, that this was to bring in more flexibility into India’s stand, considering the need to be ‘upfront’ in our thinking, and ‘not remaining frozen in time’. Ramesh stressed that in his opinion India did play a constructive role at the talks, but of note, was his reference to the need to ‘deepen our capacity to pursue proactive climate diplomacy internationally’. Clearly the government sees itself playing a more climate-sensitive and proactive role on this issue in the future, and could potentially display real leadership on the issue internationally.

Copenhagen was the beginning of a long road, one on which India has only begun to stretch its diplomatic wings and flex its political muscles. While the Copenhagen Accord in itself, is more likely than not, a beginning rather than a finished product, strong rebuffs came from the leader of the opposition in the Rajya Sabha, Arun Jaitley. He called it a US-BASIC plurilateral Accord that was likely to be accepted by other countries in the course of time, but that was a complete betrayal of poor and developing nations – and one that let developed nations off the hook. Using the Copenhagen Accord as reference, Jaitley raised some pointed questions about what this accord now implies for the Kyoto Protocol, on text that makes developing countries ‘cooperate to achieve peaking of global emissions’, on unsupported mitigation actions being subject to some form of international ‘consultation’, and the lack of mention of intellectual property rights for technology transfer in the entire document.

Jaitley indicated that an in-principle acceptance of peaking only meant a time had yet to be fixed for this, while India had previously said any reference to peaking was not acceptable to India. While he may have been expecting too much for India to be on the priority adaptation finance list, he correctly pointed out that “we are either hiding behind somebody or we are out to please somebody’” While we should not be seen as the ‘fall guys’, our own interests must not fall, he said.

A lawyer by profession, Jaitley stressed the weak links in the Copenhagen Accord, particularly the fact that the language stands diluted on a phrase by phrase basis: from ‘will achieve’ to ‘in pursuit of’, from ‘sustained implementation’ to ‘will be guided by’.

The CPM Politburo also expressed its dissatisfaction with the Accord, and slammed it for “killing the Kyoto Protocol” and negating the ‘differentiated responsibility’ principles on which the UN climate convention was based. The Communist party MPs also raised concerns about the ambiguity of the text of the Copenhagen Accord and its ‘flexible nature’, which could allow several interpretations of the same text. Sitaram Yechury said “we have opened windows for the possible jettisoning of the entire United Nations framework”’.

D. Raja, MP from Tamil Nadu and former environment minister, said the only plus point about the Copenhagen negotiations was that the negotiation process did not break down completely.

In his response, the Minister acceded that on peaking year there had been a nuanced shift from India’s previous position, but he stressed that at some time or other, India had to decide a peaking year, and that that peaking year could not obviously be set in the next century. He defended the decision to have ‘international consultations’ on the national communications, which would include details on India’s unsupported mitigation actions, as there was a clear clause on national sovereignty. He said it was a bit much to expect India to receive any funds for adaptation when island states, African nations and least developed countries were most in need of such funds. He also placed great emphasis on recognizing India’s technological prowess in the development of clean technologies and the need to recast the technology transfer debate in the light of this reality.  

While defending certain – in his own words – “nuanced shifts” in position during the negotiations, the Minister’s responses suggested a gradual evolution of the way in which climate mitigation and international climate politics are being approached. Subtle hints and comments from both Jairam Ramesh and Manmohan Singh reveal that the government has bigger plans in mind, and that it intends to see some of those plans through.

Minister clarifies Accord to Rajya Sabha

The Copenhagen climate conference finished on Saturday 19th December and within a day of the Indian delegation’s return to Delhi, Minister Jairam Ramesh was on the podium in Parliament on 22nd December, responding to the high degree of interest amongst India’s lawmakers on the outcome of the conference. This was also a time when emotions were running high with those dissatisfied with the outcome of the talks. In the upper house, the Rajya Sabha, concerns were largely to do with India not having sold out, or accepted a deal that would not be in the ’national’ or ‘developmental’ interest.

The Minister answered in detail and given some degree of confusion and mis-reporting in press reports and commentary, his replies to key issues that attracted attention are provided below:

On the death of the Kyoto Protocol

The Copenhagen Accord does not spell the demise of the Kyoto Protocol. It accepts that the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol will continue in 2010, but provides an alternative alignment. India is committed to taking the negotiations forward in 2012 which will culminate in Mexico. It is no secret that many countries want to leave the Kyoto Protocol. The accord was critical to bring the US into the mainstream of international environmental negotiations because they are the world’s number two emitter, accounting for almost 22 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions.

On MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification)

Before Copenhagen, India’s position was that it would accept international information reporting as far as our unsupported actions are concerned, but has now moved from the word ‘information’ to ‘consultations’ and ‘analysis in the Copenhagen Accord. In this respect, India’s position has shifted. But that is what meant by flexibility and this was not a unilateral decision of India, this was a decision taken collectively by China, Brazil, South Africa and India.

Senior White House Advisor David Axelrod’s statement – that the US would not only “review” the implementation of domestic actions by India and China in tune with the Copenhagen Accord but also “challenge” them if these goals were not met – was meant purely for domestic consumption to convince the US Congress and trade unions that China and India have been brought on board.

On peaking years

The Copenhagen Accord talks of global peaking but the Accord also talks of a longer timeframe for developing countries. It talks about the peaking in the context of the overriding priority being given to poverty eradication and livelihood security. The GoI has not accepted any peaking year for developing countries. But India should peak in the 21st century. Now, in which year in the 21st century, time alone will tell. But if India doesn’t peak in the 21st century, there may not be a 22nd Century.

On finance and technology transfer

India does not need any international aid and can stand on our own feet. Green technology is an area where India can emerge as a world leader. Ten years from now, India should be selling green technology to the world. Nobody is going to transfer technology for free and this needs to be negotiated and bought on commercial terms. Many Indian companies have already seen business opportunities in this. China has moved ahead. Today, of the top 10 solar companies in the world, four are Chinese. This is an opportunity for Indian technology to move ahead. In next few years India will be selling technology rather than keep repeating the stale mantra of technology transfer all the time.

India requires international financial assistance but not in the same category as Bangladesh or the Maldives or Ethiopia or Saint Lucia or Granada. There are countries in Africa, countries in small island states, countries in Asia which require more urgently than us for adaptation and mitigation. A country like India should be able to stand on its own feet and say ‘we will do what we have to do on our own.’ Why are we getting into this syndrome of always looking for international finance and international technology?