Climate portal editor, Author at The India Climate Observatory

Dry tale of ten rain weeks

August 23, 2014 by Climate portal editor Leave a Comment

What a monsoon season is can no longer be judged by the over-simplified sums that assure the country about departures from an ‘average’ and the potential of ‘catching up’ as a season progresses. Since the 2009 drought, the awareness of farmers’ cooperatives and groups about the meteorological products and data available with the only provider of such measurements has grown. What has not grown is the willingness of government agencies on the one hand, and the consuming public on the other, to make similar investments in pursuing such clarity.

The area chart with its jagged stripes is the simplest indicator of the gap between the central government’s sanguine response to a very serious monsoon deficit, and the conditions that our districts have recorded since the first week of June 2014. The chart, based on the Indian Meteorological Department’s weekly district recordings of rainfall, plots 641 of these readings over ten weeks.

Our modified monsoon measure shows the overall trend, and made the case early for state and district level relief.

It is immediately clear that the green stripe (for ‘normal’) has at no point been significantly larger than any one of the other three important stripes, coloured deep red (for ‘scanty’), peach (for ‘deficient’) and blue (for ‘excess’).

In the seventh week of monsoon 2014 (17 to 23 July 2014) the number of districts that recorded normal rainfall for that week was 126, and that is the maximum number that have reported normal rainfall for a week. The next highest number of districts reporting normal for a week is 92, which was for the preceding week (10 to 16 July 2014).

More serious is the district-level reporting for the following three weeks – ending 30 July, 06 August and 13 August – which show the number of districts that reported normal rain for each week was less than 20% of the number of districts that reported deficient, scanty or excess rainfall. It was during this period that central government ministries and agencies did not publicly disclose the widespread monsoon deficiency and which did not act, by alerting the consuming public, to the short and medium term consequences of the monsoon crisis.

The modified monsoon measure (which has been advocated as a method to prime local administrations towards early recognition of the need for relief and remedial action in drought and drought-like conditions) displays to greater effect the glaring imbalance between ‘normals’ and their absence in the districts. In every one of the ten weeks, the light red bar (the ‘deficient 2’ measure, for rainfall of 21% less and lower) dominates.

Otherwise it is the dark blue bar (the ‘excess 2’ measure, for rainfall of 21% more and above) which is next most prominent. This is the clearest signal from a close reading of the district rainfall reportage that volatility in rainfall quantities is the feature most visible throughout monsoon 2014.

The IMD’s running table of the distict rainfall departures confirms this trend for monsoon 2014. In many of the 36 meteorological sub-divisions, weeks of scanty and deficient rainfall are broken by normal or excess rainfall, only to return to scanty and deficient. Taking the districts of Odisha and of western Madhya Pradesh as examples, this volatility can be seen at a glance, and is in concurrence with the overall trends that the modified monsoon measure has been indicating for the last two months.

How ADB cooks the climate pot

August 21, 2014 by Climate portal editor 1 Comment

The Asian Development Bank has, amongst the world’s multilateral development banks, been a bit of a latecomer to the area of climate financing with the help of modelling. Its senior peers – the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – have been at it for a while, with the World Bank being rather in its own league if one was to judge by the tonnage of reports it has printed. The ADB probably holds its own on the matter against the Inter-American Development Bank and the African Development Bank, but this latest effort, I think, pushes it ahead of the last two.

Not for any reason that would gladden a farmer or a municipal worker, for that is not the audience intended for ‘Assessing the costs of climate change and adaptation in South Asia’ (Asian Development Bank, 2014), which was released to the Asian world a few days ago. But the volume should immensely help the modelling crews from a dozen and more international agencies that specialise in this arcane craft. Providing the scientific basis around which a multilateral lending bank can plan its climate financing strategies will help the craft find a future. Rather less sunny is the outlook for states and districts, cities and panchayats, who may find an over-zealous administrator or two quoting blithely from such a report while in search of elusive ‘mitigation’.

The reassuring shapes of indecipherable models

In my view, this volume is useless. It is so because it is based on a variety of modelling computations which have their origin in the methods used for the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (that was released in 2007). The permanent problem with all such ‘earth science’ modelling approaches is that it uses global data sets which must be ‘downscaled’ to local regions. No matter how sophisticated they are claimed to be by their inventors and sponsors, such models can only work with regular and large sets of well-scrubbed data that have been collected the same way over a long period of time and recorded reliably. This may serve a ‘global’ model (which is irrelevant to us in the districts) but in almost every single case of ‘downscaling’, a scaling down may make a smattering of sense if there is some comparable data relating to the region for which the scaling is taking place. And this correlation, I can assure you, is not possible 99 times out of 100.

But that doesn’t bother the ADB, because it is a bank, it must find a way for Asian countries to agree to taking loans that help them mitigate the effects of rampaging climate change, as this report tries to convince us about. Which is why the ADB has said its unimpeachable analysis is based on “a three-step modeling approach” and this is “(i) regional climate modeling (ii) physical impact assessment, and (iii) economic assessment”, the last aspect being what they’re betting the thermometer on.

The numbers that have emerged from the ADB’s computable general equilibrium model must be satisfyingly enormous to the bank’s thematic project directors and country directors. For the scenario modellers have provided the ammunition for the bank to say: “The region requires funding with the magnitude of 1.3% of GDP on average per annum between 2010 and 2050 under the business-as-usual-1 scenario. The cost could rise to up to 2.3% (upper range) of GDP per annum taking into account climate uncertainties. To avoid climate change impact under the business-as-usual-2 scenario, adaptation cost of around $73 billion per annum on the average is required between now and 2050.”

I could not, in this needlessly dense and poorly written volume, find a mention of which rice strains have been measured for their yields in the example given for India, when the ADB report makes some dire forecasts about how yields will be lowered or will plunge under several forecast conditions. Perhaps they were buried in some footnote I have overlooked, but considering that the International Rice Research Institute (one of the more dangerous CGIAR monster institutes) has in its genebank more than 40,000 varieties from India, and considering that rice conservationist Debal Deb cultivates 920 varieties himself, the ADB (and its modelling troupe) talking about rice ‘yield’ means nothing without telling us which variety in which region. And that sort of negligence naturally leads me to ask what sort of thermometers they consulted while assembling these models.

– Rahul Goswami

At home and abroad

August 18, 2014 by Climate portal editor Leave a Comment

The size and diversity of India’s federal structure (36 states and union territories) is steering this government towards an arrangement wherein the assessment of development needs and outcomes is carried out at least at the state level. As the new India Climate Watch has pointed out, this is where India’s contribution to the international climate change negotiations appears quite out of phase with the climate aspect of development discussions and actions in these 36 states and union territories.

We ask whether the state action plans on climate change (some of which in their final forms are now several years old) are fit for the task of guiding policy at this level, a serious and urgent question which, in our view, ought to precede India’s taking of international positions on climate change adaptation and mitigation measures (including financing and technology transfer).

With the meeting of the BASIC group of countries on 7-8 August 2014 in New Delhi, a stretch of negotiating has begun for India which will continue with greater intensity until the 21st Conference of Parties in Paris in December 2015. This is seen by climate negotiators as the final stretch of the Kyoto Protocol period and we can expect a flurry of weighty summations to be produced during this time, which may influence how the successor to the Kyoto Protocol will begin to be framed, a procedure that COP 21 will be devoted to.

For India, this period will proceed in parallel with the first term of the NDA government, which will be expected to deliver much more substantial leadership on matters of equity in the international arena, and which is already committed to strengthening the federal approach at home. Our view is that these are not exclusive, and that one can guide the other.

Under direction from the central government, our states have been preparing climate action plans geared to their conditions. The Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change reports that 28 of these plans have been prepared, and how these will integrate with the economic and social imperatives that each state government frames differently has not been explored. Until that happens as a policy commitment, the state action plans remain academic exercises with action on the ground in the form of relatively small projects channelled through ‘technology transfer’ agencies. These may help indicate how feasible a future course is but which is weak without state government and industry resolve. [Click this link for the India Climate Watch 2014 03 (pdf 186kb).]

The IMD’s shaky monsoon math

August 7, 2014 by Climate portal editor Leave a Comment

Over eight weeks of recorded monsoon rain, the district-level data available with the India Meteorological Department (IMD) portrays a picture that is very different from its ‘national’ and ‘regional’ advice about the strength and consistency of rainfall.

In its first weekly briefing on the monsoon of August 2014, IMD said: “For the country as a whole, cumulative rainfall during this year’s monsoon (01 June to 30 July 2014) has so far upto 30 July been 23% below the Long Period Average.” Out of 36 meteorological sub-divisions, said the IMD, the rainfall has been normal over 15 and deficient over 21 sub-divisions.

Readings for each district that has reported rainfall consistently for eight weeks. The columns represent the percentage value of actual rainfall for each district against their normal rainfall for eight weeks.

However, we have compiled a far more realistic reading of the monsoon season so far, from the IMD’s own data. For the 614 individual readings from districts that have regular rainfall readings, we have the following: 86 districts have registered scanty rainfall (-99% to -60%); 281 districts have registered deficient rainfall (-59% to -20%); 200 districts have registered normal rainfall (-19% to +19%); and 47 districts have registered excess rainfall (+20% and more).

Moreover, using our running weekly district-level monsoon meter – the details of which and the reasoning for which you will find in here – we see that there was a substantial dip in the number of districts registering ‘deficient 2’ rainfall, which is less than 21% of the normal and lower, during the seventh week of rain, that is the week of 17 to 23 July. But the general trend returned the following week, 24 to 30 July.

What this means, and the bar chart we have provided to illustrate the 614 individual values leaves us in no doubt, is that 367 out of 614 districts have had meagre rain for eight weeks. This also means that over eight weeks where there should have been rainfall that – as the IMD predicted in early June – would be around 95% of the ‘long period average’, instead three out of five districts have had less than 80% of their usual quota.

Our running weekly district-level monsoon meter to aid governance decisions shows the overall trend has not changed substantially in the last fortnight despite good rains during the seventh monsoon week.

Unfortunately, the press and media – in particular the business and financial media – persist in reporting ‘national’ deficits and whether monsoon 2014 will ‘make up’ the average in the remaining period. This approach must be corrected by the IMD’s departmental divisions as it incorrectly makes popular the notion that total rainfall over a designated number of weeks is the most important monsoon metric (See ‘Why there is no ‘normal’ in our monsoon’). Of course it is not so, as different crops follow their own crop calendars according to the agro-ecological regions they are grown in, and require optimum rain at certain times during their respective crop calendars.

The following examples show why such reporting can be misleading:

From Reuters: “August rains hold the key to India’s major summer crops such as rice, soybean, cane and cotton, after a wet end to July failed to make up fully for a dry start to the four-month monsoon season. A late revival shrank the shortfall in rain to around 10 percent below average in July, the India Meteorological Department’s update showed on Thursday, a sharp improvement from the 43 percent deficit in the first month of the season.”

From Bloomberg: “Monsoon crops are sown from June and harvested from October. The country had less than 40 percent of average rains in the first six weeks of the monsoon season that runs through September. The shortage shrank to 23 percent by end-July. Oilseed planting in India is poised to slump as much as 24 percent to the lowest since 2002 after a weak start to the monsoon.”

From The Hindu: “With the country receiving good rain in July, monsoon deficiency has gone down to 23 percent, the MET department on Friday said. While the monsoon deficiency at the national level in June was 43 per cent, by July end it has come down to 23 per cent. Central India, which saw little rain in June, has by now seen some good rain. It received 402.2 mm of rainfall as compared to expected rainfall of 477.7 mm with a deficiency of 16 per cent, much lesser compared to other parts of the country.”

From Business Standard: “According to the India Meteorological Department (IMD), the rains managed to recoup much of the June losses due to strong revival over the central and western regions, and parts of northern India. Weather officials said the momentum of July would continue till about August 10 and then slacken a bit.”

From Mint: “India’s July rain deficit narrowed to 10% of the long-term average for the month, marking a recovery from the driest June in five years, the India Meteorological Department (IMD) said, as kharif crop sowing picked up in tandem. The shrinking of the rainfall deficit in July comes at a time when policymakers have been concerned about the impact of a below-average monsoon on foodgrain production and inflation. The June-September monsoon accounts for more than 70% of the annual rainfall in India and irrigates crops grown on half the country’s farmlands.”

Deadly negligence

August 4, 2014 by Climate portal editor Leave a Comment

A resident looks at the debris of her damaged house after a landslide at Malin village, Pune district, in Maharashtra on 30 July 2014. Photo: Reuters/Stringer

Two months of monsoon that have delivered rainfall considerably below normal have given way to an end July and early August that has brought torrents of rain in some locations, and with it destruction and the loss of life.

In the last week, there has been a landslide in the Pune district, western Maharashtra, in which the death toll has risen to over 100. There has been a landslide in Nepal, along the Bhote Kosi river, around 120 kilometres from Kathmandu, which is reported to have killed over 100 and displaced thousands. The situation there has led to an emergency in north Bihar, through which the Kosi flows, with some 65,000 people being evacuated from nine districts.

In the Bay of Bengal, 40 trawlers are reported to have gone missing in bad weather; there are estimated to be some 650 fishermen on board the vessels. In the Munshiganj district of central Bangladesh, about 40 kilometres from Dhaka, a ferry on the Padma river sank with about 200 on board.

Every one of these events is repeated every monsoon – landslide, flood, river ferry sinking, fishing trawlers missing at sea – with little indication that learning takes place about how to contain the impacts and how to prepare for them when they become threats.

The threat from the Kosi developed after a massive landslide blocked the main course of Bhote Kosi river, a tributary of the Kosi, in Sindhupalchok district of Nepal. The landslide brought down rock which has dammed the river, immediately forming a large lake. Authorities in Nepal have been trying to release the water without endangering downstream regions.

The central government has said (o4 August Monday) that there is no immediate threat of a flood. India’s Home Ministry, the Nepal Water Commission, India’s Central Water Commission and India’s National Crisis Management Committee are coordinating preparations, relief and technical expertise. The Bihar state government is carrying our the evactuations to avoid a situation like 2008, when a breach in the Kosi embankment at Kushaha in Nepal caused one of the most devastating floods.

The landslide in Nepal and the emergency in downstream Bihar has again revived the debate as to whether a dam would help solve the problem of floods in north Bihar. Since 1945 there have been commissions to study the problem and make their recommendations, and proposed dams have been abandoned for compelling reasons – that the river valleys have unstable foundations, that the region is a high-risk seismic zone, that the reservoirs would silt up far sooner than expected, and that the costs would be prohibitive.

The tragic incidents in Maharashtra, in the Bay of Bengal, and in Munshiganj (Bangladesh) have much more to do with the wilful neglect of conditions that have built up a cumulative threat. The landslide in Pune district which has buried portions of a village, its residents and cattle, was according to a number of media reports the result of factors that included what appears to be no recognition of the most obvious risks. The hill above the village of Malin is reported to have been the site of wind turbines (which need heavy machinery to erect them) and also farming that used heavy equipment to level the top of the hill. Whichever factor is true, the use to which hill land was put was a threat to the settlement at its base, and little thought was given to monsoon conditions.

That such a large group of trawlers went missing in the Bay of Bengal near Kakdwip in South 24 Parganas district of West Bengal has to do with economic reasons, which media reports will at this stage not uncover. Three of the trawlers are reported as having capsized and authorities in West Bengal are said to have ‘traced’ 25 of the vessels. The question is: when squally weather and forecasts of heavy rain trigger warning to fishermen, why do they ignore these warnings and risk their lives? The usual answer is loan economics, for the trawler owners can’t afford delays in servicing the loans with which they bought the vessels, and are under pressure to find and sell fish, which is when safety considerations are ignored.

Similar considerations lead in Bangladesh to riverine ferries – a common mode of transport in great deltas – being overloaded to far beyond their capacities. The monsoon brings with it weather conditions that demand safety first, but when economic desperation and plain greed set in, elementary precautions that are meant to save lives are discarded.

Cows, scooters and climate talks

July 27, 2014 by Climate portal editor Leave a Comment

To what degree should international negotiation be India’s major theoretical activity when dealing with climate change? To what extent do India’s negotiators at the UNFCCC annual series of meetings represent its people at home, and if so through which channels? How are governance and determination of choices at the local level in India – choices that can lead to more communities becoming more responsible about their climate change impacts – translated by our negotiators at annual international meetings? These are some of the questions we find need to be asked more sharply, and more persistently, and for which we wish to hear answers.

Commentaries like ‘A map and a compass for climate talks’, by Navroz K Dubash and Lavanya Rajamani of the Centre for Policy Research (published in The Hindu, 23 July 2014), give us an interesting glimpse of the world that our international climate talks negotiators inhabit, but it has not posed such questions nor helped provide answers. This is the dialectic that needs to change, and quickly. It is 17 years since the Kyoto Protocol was adopted and every year thereafter, the number of meetings for negotiations has increased and the numbers of those who are now experts at negotiations has swelled at an ever faster rate. This new and hyper-mobile population of negotiators cannot claim any success, however minor, that has come from this annual festival of discussion (carried out by spending taxpayers’ money). What then is their use, to us in India especially?

In their article, Dubash and Rajamani have provided a rapid account of the adoption of negotiating positions by India and the differences between them at different periods. They have illustrated this by referring to articles written recently by former Environment and Forests Minister Jairam Ramesh and by Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, described as “a mainstay of India’s negotiating team for two decades”. Given the failure rate of the annual round of climate change negotiations, the strategical quibbling by both Ramesh and Dasgupta are of very little use locally in India. That is why we think the Centre for Policy Research and similar institutes and establishments which study climate change in all its perplexing colours (none of them more frustrating than the UN negotiations) must alter the subject – to the ‘whom’ of people where they live rather than the ‘what’ of negotiating positions.

The two authors, looking ahead to “the next landmark climate negotiating session” – we ask that empty hyperbole like ‘landmark’ be dropped from a process that is nothing but 20 years of getting nowhere expensively – have said it is time to “look forward and anticipate how a principled approach, strategic vision, political acumen and technical expertise can be better combined in India’s negotiating approach”. Surely, Ramesh and Dasgupta (perhaps in reverse order) ought to be bluntly asked why India has not had a principled approach, strategic vision, political acumen and technical expertise which – and we emphasise this – helps deal with climate change locally, in the districts and towns, and which then becomes the position that India takes in the crowded climate talks ballrooms of the world?

The commentary is worried about preparations to be made before the next big meeting in 2015. The usual formula is there – “national contributions”, “emissions mitigation component”, “adaptation, finance, technology and capacity building” and (best of all for the financiers who haunt every COP) “proposed investments”. The authors then refer to the Economic Survey 2013-14, which has a chapter (it is chapter 12, out of place amongst the others as if it wandered in from some storybook) on climate change. This they say mentions the need to develop contributions but that this mention has come very late – cue Messers Dasgupta and Ramesh for sepia-toned explanations.

And finally, the authors complain that “there is little evidence of a serious national dialogue on such contributions, which is critical to ensuring ownership of, responsibility for and delivery of these contributions across levels of governance and segments of society”. They could have spoken more plainly. There is no dialogue, because the central and state governments have not invested in dialogue (ask Ramesh how he got his government to invest in an excellent national discussion about Bt brinjal), and because our negotiators at COP, CMP, SBI and SBSTA never bothered to ask for it either. Who did it suit to cloak climate negotiations as being about technology, finance and law to an exclusively expert degree, thereby shutting the citizen out?

What we wish to hear very much of – and the Ministry has not obliged – is where the priorities of the BJP-led NDA government mesh (or clash) with the theory of a multi-lateral approach to climate change negotiations (now 20 years old). The climate circuit and its habitues in (and from) India have become used to the vocabulary of the circuit, so used to it that they have neglected to learn some of the other vocabularies found in documents such as the Union Budget speech and the Economic Survey, which have very much less to do with multi-lateral feinting at UNFCCC meetings and very much more to do with gritty economics at home. It isn’t too late for India to sound more like Gorakhpur than like Geneva at such talks, and only when that happens will we see tehsil and municipality begin to respond – the ‘equity’ that India is said to be a champion of at the negotiations can only have substance if it begins at home.

– Rahul Goswami

Seeing the local in six rain weeks

July 23, 2014 by Climate portal editor Leave a Comment

RG_ICP_20140723_pic We urge the Ministry of Earth Sciences, the India Meteorology Department and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to cease the use of a ‘national’ rainfall average to describe the progress of monsoon 2014. This is a measure that has no meaning for cultivators in any of our agro-ecological zones, and has no meaning for any individual taluka or tehsil in the 36 meteorological sub-divisions. What we need to see urgently adopted is a realistic overview that numerically and graphically explains the situation, at as granular a level as possible.

Using a revised categorisation of rainfall sufficiency levels (the method and the reasoning is available here) we find that for the fifth and sixth weeks of monsoon, there has been a small improvement which does not lower the high likelihood of drought conditions becoming prevalent in districts and scarcity of water for our settlements. The full-size chart is available here as an image, and explains in detail the rainfall that districts are reporting.

The fifth monsoon week is 03 to 09 July 2014 and the sixth monsoon week is 10 to 16 July 2014. There has been a small addition to the revised normal rainfall category (-5% to +5%), rising from 18 districts recording normal rainfall in the 4th week to 22 in the 5th and 28 in the 6th. There has also been an improvement in the number of districts recording deficit-2 levels of rainfall (-21% and more) with 437 in the 4th week, 411 in the 5th week and 385 in the 6th week. For the remainder of July the likelihood of more rainfall in the districts that have recorded normal or excess-1 (+6% to +20%) is small, according to the available forecasts, and this means that monsoon 2014 will begin August with far fewer districts registering normal rainfall than they should at this stage.

Decoding reservoirs for the rest of us

July 21, 2014 by Climate portal editor Leave a Comment

Every week, the Central Water Commission releases to the public and to government departments the numbers that describe how much water is stored in 85 reservoirs in India. These are the reservoirs designated as nationally important, because of their roles in providing water for large irrigated command areas and for generating hydro-electric power (37 of these dams).

These readings are taken as the authoritative compilation of the current weekly state of water storage, and are widely used in government. Amongst the uses is to recommend the rationing of water consumption in the states and urban settlements. Another use is to help determine what advice to broadcast to our farmers about when they can sow seeds (if their fields are irrigated by the canals that radiate outwards from these dams).

But of course these are only 85, even if they are the biggest. Whether Bargi in Madhya Pradesh is half full does not interest in the least a farmer in Purnea, Bihar. Whether Tungabhadra in Karnataka is filling up well in the last two weeks is of no consequence to the residents of Rohtak in Haryana. That Yeldari in Maharashtra has water at a level very much lower it should be at this time of the year does not affect the cultivators of Virudhanagar, Tamil Nadu.

Bihar has 24 large dams (and groundwater) and Tamil Nadu has 116 while Madhya Pradesh has 898 large dams other than Bargi, but we have no weekly or monthly information about how much water these hold, in the first week of June or at end July. And this is what we don’t know for all the 4,839 dams – in the national register of large dams – that are not amongst the list of 85. The Central Water Commission tells us that it uses the combined readings for the 85 large dams because, with their total of about 155 billion cubic metres (bcm) of water storage (if they are all full), they form a large portion of the approximately 254 (bcm) of total reservoir storage available in India (excluding tanks, ponds and traditional water storage structures). But, for the smallholder cultivator and the town council of a Class 2 urban settlement, it is the 50 million cubic metres reservoir in the next taluka that they depend on for water, not on any of the big 85.

What can we then do with the weekly reservoir storage bulletin from the CWC? My approach is to treat it as an indicator of the collection of rainfall by reservoirs in the same meteorological region and agro-ecological zone. When the list is divided into ten groups, by reservoir size, we see far more clearly the effect of the last two weeks of rainfall on the storage levels. Until we can persuade state and central governments to invest in widespread and cheap monitoring of as many of our water storage receptacles as possible, we may use the CWC bulletin as an indicator.

By Rahul Goswami

The panel of charts shows water storage ranges (at full capacity of the dams) for the groups of reservoirs. Starting with the smallest first: 56 million cubic metres (mcm) to 176 mcm (tenth group); 184 mcm to 380 mcm (ninth group); 399 mcm to 523 mcm (eighth group); 524 mcm to 735 mcm (seventh group); 767 mcm to 927 mcm (sixth group); 935 mcm to 1.436 billion cubic metres (bcm) (fifth group); 1.456 bcm to 1.994 bcm (fourth group); 2.171 bcm to 2.676 bcm (third group); 3.046 bcm to 5.378 bcm (second group); 5.649 bcm to 9.745 bcm (first group).

Government readies drought plan

July 18, 2014 by Climate portal editor Leave a Comment

The drought management information system is in place and working.

The Ministry of Agriculture through the Department of Agriculture and Cooperation has released its national drought crisis management plan. This is not taken as the indicator that drought conditions are expected to set in, but to prepare for them where they are identified. In the fifth week of the South-West monsoon, the trend continues to be that week by week, the number of districts that have recorded less rainfall than they normally receive outnumber those districts with normal rainfall. When this happens over a prolonged period, such as four to six weeks, drought-like conditions set in and the administration prepares for these conditions. [Links to the documents are at the end of this posting.]

There are a group of ‘early warning indicators’ for the kharif crop (sowing June to August) which are looked for at this time of the year. They are: (1) delay in the onset of South-West monsoon, (2) long ‘break’ activity of the monsoon, (3) insufficient rains during June and July, (4) rise in the price of fodder, (5) absence of rising trend in the water levels of the major reservoirs, (6) drying up of sources of rural drinking water, (7) declining trend in the progress of sowing over successive weeks compared to corresponding figures for ‘normal years’.

On this list, points 1 and 2 are true, 3 is true for June and July until now, 4 and 5 are true, we have insufficient information for 6 and 7 but from mid-May there have been a number of media reports on water scarcity in the districts of peninsular, central and northern India. Thus the state of the ‘early warning’ indicators taken together have triggered the issuing of the government’s drought crisis management plan.

“The identified priorities of CMP are to clarify the goals and define the roles and responsibilities of various responders (ministries / departments, organisations and individuals) involved in crisis management, and putting together a communication process for quickly notifying the public in the event of a crisis,” the ministry has explained. “The plan outlined in this document does not replace the emergency procedures or contingency action plans already drawn by different agencies, but has been developed to address crisis situations that have the potential for a much greater impact on the nation.”

The reason we have plans at the national and state level, and contingency plans for each district in the event of drought, drought-like conditions, and water scarcity is the combination of several factors:

Every year more than 50 million people are directly exposed to drought and its effects, with 16% of India’s total area considered prone to drought.
In four out of every ten years rainfall in India is erratic.
Drought in varying degrees affects 68% of the sown area.
Regions with annual rainfall of 750-1,125 millimetres account for 35% of the land area and are drought prone.
Most of these zones lie in the arid (19.6%), semi-arid (37%) and sub-humid (21%) regions of India.
Up to three-quarters of the annual average rainfall occurs over 120 days of the year. A third of the total land area receives less than 750 mm of rainfall and is chronically drought prone.

In this ‘warning phase’ – which many districts have entered – the crisis management plan calls for short-term water conservation measures by municipal and district agencies, water-budgeting by the Ministry of Water Resources (Irrigation), the Ministry of Urban Development and by the Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation. Municipal and town councils are instructed to identify alternative sources of water when the town is in a ‘warning’ period and the supply of water may be restricted to 70 litres per person per day (about half of the normal 135). Water rationing and restricted use become urgent with municipal and town councils instructed to ensure that drinking water is not used for other purposes (like washing cars, watering gardens, and so on).

State governments have in place standing instructions of designating officers responsible for meeting the needs of rural and urban citizens during drought and drought-like conditions. This document contains the list of nodal officers of the line ministries and departments, and of the Ministry of Agriculture’s drought management division, with their contact details. The full crisis management plan of the Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture and Cooperation, is here.

India Climate Watch bulletin, on Budget 2014-15

July 14, 2014 by Climate portal editor Leave a Comment

The first Union Budget of the Bharatiya Janata Party-led National Democratic Alliance government has focused on the growth of the economy. Finance Minister Arun Jaitley has through India’s 2014-15 budget said he will “usher in a policy regime” that takes the country “towards a sustained growth of 7-8 per cent or above within the next 3-4 years”.

Such an approach will have a very sizeable impact on India’s response to climate change. Industry and the states take their cues from the broad direction given in the annual budget, which is the most authoritative and powerful regular statement by the government that guides citizens, businesses, the public sector, and administrations at every level. In this edition of India Climate Watch, we quickly analyse the 2014 budget for what it will mean to the country’s ability to deal with a changing climate.

In the second India Climate Watch of our new series, we unpack key statements in Union Budget 2014-15 for what they mean to the country’s need to balance economic imperatives against the growing national footprint. We find a few positives and several points of concern, which are:

The Finance Minister said it is his duty to steer towards desired macro-economic outcomes of higher growth, lower inflation, sustained level of external sector balance and a prudent policy stance. He added that “it would not be wise to expect everything that can be done or must be done to be in the first Budget presented within forty five days of the formation of this government”. Positive, with qualifications
Higher growth is presented as the “sine qua non” that continues in this budget -as has been the trend for the last decade – to search for a link with bringing a large section of India’s population out of poverty. Negative
A number of individual provisions collectively mean greater support to renewable energy and to making efficiency in conventional energy generation the basis for power generation. The use of electricity in agriculture (by erratically metered or unmetered pumpsets) is to be addressed by solar power-driven pumpsets. A ‘clean energy cess’ on the extraction of coal has been doubled. Positive

The relationship between the central government and states is a factor that influences budgetary support for dealing with the effects of climate change. Read why in the India Climate Watch bulletin 2014 02 (pdf, 187kb).

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